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INTRODUCTION
The Coconino National Forest is not the first thing that comes to mind
when considering the protection of religious free exercise in the United
States. However, a case currently on petition to the United States Supreme
Court, Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service,2 has demonstrated
how interconnected our nation's public land is with religious free exercise.
This particular case has given rise to a heated debate regarding our willing-
ness to protect free exercise in the face of inconvenient consequences and
unconventional religious practice.4
Six Native American Tribes5 ("Tribes") in the southwestern United
States have challenged the United States Forest Service ("USFS") under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 6 RFRA provides
legislative protection to free exercise; it mandates that all cases where the
free exercise of religion is "substantially burdened" be justified by a com-
pelling state interest accomplished via the least restrictive means. The
Tribes' RFRA challenge centers on a decision by the USFS to allow Ari-
zona Snowbowl ("Snowbowl"), a private ski resort operating in the Cocon-
1. J.D. received May 2009 from The University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana.
2. 408 F. Supp.2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (Navajo Nation 1); 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007) (Navajo
Nation I1); 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (Navajo Nation III).
3. Navajo Nation II, 535 F.3d at 1063.
4. Id. at 1063.
5. The Plaintiff Tribes include: the Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, the Havasupai Tribe, the
Hualapai Tribe, the White Mountain Apache Nation, and the Yavapai Apache Nation. Navajo Nation 1,
408 F. Supp. 2d at 869-70.
6. Navajo Nation I, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 869-70.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2008).
PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
ino National Forest under a special use permit, to use treated sewage efflu-
ent in an artificial snowmaking operation. 8 The purpose of the snowmaking
operation is to stabilize and lengthen the operating season of the private,
Arizona ski resort.9 Unfortunately for the Tribes, Snowbowl is located on
the San Francisco Peaks.' 0 More specifically the resort lies on Humphrey's
Peak," the most sacred mountain in the spiritual traditions of the plaintiff
Tribes. 12 The Tribes have claimed, and the courts have recognized at vari-
ous times, that the use of this sewage water will have devastating effects on
tribal and individual spirituality. 3 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, has refused to characterize this devastation as a
"substantial burden;" consequently the Tribes are refused relief under
RFRA. 14  The court's decision is based on an unnecessary, artificially re-
strictive interpretation of substantial burden under RFRA. 5
RFRA requires that a person demonstrate the existence of a substantial
burden on their ability to freely exercise their religion; after this showing
the burden of proof shifts to the government to demonstrate it has a compel-
ling interest in the burdensome action and it is utilizing the least restrictive
means possible to accomplish its objective.' 6 Despite uncontroverted evi-
dence establishing the devastating effects the planned snowmaking opera-
tion will have the Plaintiffs' spiritual practice,17 on August 8, 2008, the long
history of denying Native Americans free exercise protection continued
when the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, determined the Tribes had failed to
demonstrate their free exercise was substantially burdened.' 8 The court that
Tribal free exercise was not substantially burdened because the Tribes'
challenge did not fit into either of two discreet factual scenarios laid out in
the cases Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.19 The court held that
the only burdens recognized under RFRA are those arising under circum-
stances mirroring those present in Sherbert and Verner.20
The Tribes have met both success and failure on their journey to guard
their free exercise rights.2' The ultimate decision not to recognize a sub-
stantial burden on the Tribe's exercise will undoubtedly have far-reaching
implications for the protection of Native American religious exercise. The
8. Navajo Nation I, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 869-71.
9. Id. at 873.
10. Id. at 870.
11. Navajo Nation Ill, 535 F.3d at 1064.
12. Id. at 1080 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
13. Navajo Nation 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 887-895; Navajo Nation II, 479 F.3d at 1029.
14. Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1063.
15. See id. at 1063.
16. Id. at 1068.
17. Jd. at 1063-64.
18. Id. at 1078.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Navajo Nation 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 908; Navajo Nation Ii, 472 F. 3d at 1047; Navajo
Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1067.
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most recent incarnation of Navajo Nation grossly misstates the legal stan-
dard that governs substantial burdens under RFRA.22 RFRA requires a
23three part inquiry . The Ninth Circuit's most recent decision has allowed
the analytical framework established by Congress to be flipped on its head
- the third question surrounding the means utilized by the government in
accomplishing its objective is used to define the scope of the initial inquiry
into whether a person's free exercise has been substantially burdened.24
The en banc court's decision tracks a long judicial trend of denying relief
to plaintiffs in free exercise challenges.25  There exists a long history of
tension between Congress and the courts over the appropriate standard of
review in free exercise cases.26 Congress favors strict scrutiny while the
Court has repeatedly imposed the less rigorous standard of rational basis2 7
However, this debate, at least in part, was "settled" by Congress with the
passage of RFRA, mandating strict scrutiny in "all cases where free exer-
cise is substantially burdened. 28 Yet, we again see the court attempting to
restrict the protections provided to free exercise in Navajo Nation III. By
limiting the burdens recognized under RFRA to the discrete factual scenar-
ios of Sherbert and Yoder the court has conflated the inquiry under RFRA,
and infused the first question of whether free exercise has been substan-
tially burdened with the third question of whether the state is furthering its
compelling interesting by utilizing the least restrictive means possible. 9
Herein lays the court's greatest mistake. By artificially restricting substan-
tial burdens to either: (1) government benefits conditioned on violation of
religious tenets, or (2) threatened criminal or civil liability for adherence to
religious tenets,3 ° the court effectively eviscerates RFRA and prevents it
from fulfilling its stated purpose - the application of strict scrutiny in all
cases where free exercise is substantially burdened.3' Congress specifically
stated that its intention was not to constrain the situations under which free
exercise was substantially burdened.32
RFRA clearly lays out a three step inquiry for determining if free exer-
cise has been unacceptably infringed. The integrity of the inquiry must be
maintained if the rule of law is to be preserved. The question of whether
22. See Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1081 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
24. Navajo Nation 1I1, 535 F.3d at 1069.
25. Student Author, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120 Harv. L. Rev.
2178 (June 2007).
26. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997); H.R. Rpt. 103-88 (May 11, 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(i)-(2).
27. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507; H.R. Rpt. 103-88; 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(b)(l)-(2).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l).
29. Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1069-70.
30. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
32. H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
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free exercise has been substantially burdened is separate from the question
of whether the state is furthering its compelling interest via the least restric-
tive means. By allowing the third part of the inquiry to consume the first,
the court has perverted the statute and made it impossible for the statute to
carry out its stated purpose. If the court is reticent to apply the statutory test
due to the potentially paralyzing consequences of its application it is acting
ultra vires and violates the principles of separation of powers.33 The setting
of national priorities is a political decision that has already been decided by
Congress.34 It is the court's duty to apply the law as written and intended;
if there are unintended consequences it is the job of Congress, not the court,
to fashion a remedy. 35 The proper role of the court in statutory interpreta-
36tion is giving effect to the intent of Congress. Tribal success in this litiga-
tion is not a foregone conclusion when the statute is applied properly, but
the court should not bar the court's door to the Tribes based on a misappli-
cation of the law. In this particular instance, the harsh consequence of the
court's decision is to "read American Indians out of RFRA. 3 7
This note will demonstrate how the Ninth Circuit has arbitrarily and un-
necessarily restricted the circumstances under which a person can bring a
RFRA claim. Part II will discuss RFRA, the principles underlying its en-
actment, and the relevant case law interpreting RFRA. Part III will exam-
ine RFRA's companion statute the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). RLUIPA utilizes the same language and frame-
work as RFRA and is informative when interpreting RFRA's standards. 38
Part TV will finally look at the application of RFRA in Navajo Nation.
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
RFRA requires that any substantial burden on the free exercise of relig-
ion be justified by a compelling state interest accomplished by the least
restrictive means. 39 Although RFRA does not specifically define what con-
stitutes a "substantial burden" under the statute, it is clear that the purpose
of RFRA was to expand the protection of free exercise and reinstate strict
33. See Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated 499 U.S. 933
(1991).
34. Laurence H. Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism? A Retrospective, 21
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 607, 618 (1998). Judge Silberman identifies policy issues as "those questions
of public concern on which the body politic or political institutions have free range of choice;" those
questions are resolved by legislatures or constitutional conventions when they "crystallize" the majority
view into rules. Id. According to Silberman, "[ilf a judge exercises policy choice when deciding what
these rules mean," that judge is an "activist." Id.; Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meaning of
"Judicial Activism," 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1441, 1445-49 (2004) (summarizing Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
The Supreme Court: 1947, Fortune, Jan. 1947).
35. Silberman, supra n. 34.
36. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 105 (Harvard U. Press 1977).
37. Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1113-1114 (Fletcher, Pregerson, Fisher, JJ., dissenting).
38. See generally Gonzales v. O'Centro Espiritu Beneficente, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (cited in
Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1095 (Fletcher, J., dissenting)).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
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scrutiny in all cases where religious free exercise was substantially bur-
dened. 40 Congress utilized this broad language intentionally - evidencing a
desire to protect free exercise against state infringement whenever possi-
ble.4 ' The statutory text, underlying purpose of RFRA, the legislative his-
tory, prior free exercise jurisprudence, and interpretations of identical pro-
visions in companion statutes all indicate that a substantial burden on free
exercise can take many forms and reject the proposition that substantial
burdens are narrowly limited to cases where a government benefit has been
conditioned on violation of one's religious beliefs or where a person is
threatened with criminal or civil liability for adhering to the mandates of
their faith.
RFRA was enacted with the explicit purpose of counteracting the narrow
reading of free exercise protection under the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith.42 Under Smith the Supreme Court drastically limited free exercise
protections when infringement was caused by neutral, generally applicable
laws and regulations.43 The Court rejected strict scrutiny of free exercise
infringement, instead requiring rational basis review unless the statute on its
face targets a particular religious practice or implicates another constitu-
tional right.44 Only under these circumstances were free exercise chal-
lenges afforded strict scrutiny.4 Otherwise, the state action had to merely
demonstrate a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest to withstand
judicial review. 46 Smith was the catalyst to Congressional Action. 47 Fol-
lowing Smith the free exercise clause had become almost meaningless; the
likelihood of a statute directly targeting a particular religious practice was
nil thereby leaving the free exercise clause largely irrelevant; despite its
presence in the First Amendment. 48 RFRA was Congress's response to
Smith.
49
In passing RFRA Congress noted that the compelling interest test set
forth in pre-Smith Federal cases provided a "workable test for striking sen-
sible balances between religious liberty and competing prior government
interests, and mandated its application "in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened., 50  The statute requires that when free
40. Id.
41. H.R. Rpt. 103-88; See also Dworkin, supra n. 36, at 109 (the terms used in a statute provide the
interpretative parameters). This indicates that in using broad language, "all cases," Congress intended
an expansion of free exercise protections.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
43. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-879, 885; Craig J. Dorsay and Lea Ann Easton, Employment Division v.
Smith: Just Say "No" to the Free Exercise Clause, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 555, 584-87 (Spring 1991).
44. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, 881-82; Dorsay, supra n. 43, at 584-87.
45. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, 881-82; Dorsay, supra n. 43, at 584-87.
46. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887-89, 883.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
48. H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4); H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
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exercise is substantially burdened the courts should apply the compelling
interest test from Sherbert and Yoder.5'
A. Sherbert v. Verner
Sherbert involved the religious practices of a Seventh Day Adventist.
52
She was employed at a textile factory when it transitioned from a five to a
six-day work week. 53 It is a violation of the tenets of the Seventh Day Ad-
ventist faith to work on Saturdays.54 The Plaintiff was fired from her job
due to her refusal to work on Saturdays following the transition.55 She was
unable to find employment that did not require Saturday work, and conse-
quently applied for state unemployment benefits. 56 The Plaintiff was de-
nied unemployment benefits because she refused Saturday work.57
The Plaintiff succeeded in having the state regulation denying her unem-
ployment benefits declared unconstitutional - a violation of the First
Amendment's free exercise protections. 58 The appropriate definition of the
burden on the Plaintiff, following the passage of RFRA, was the require-
ment that she work on Saturday; having to work on Saturday was the sub-
stantial burden on her free exercise. 59 The state interest presented was to
avoid "the filing of fraudulent [unemployment benefit] claims by unscrupu-
lous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not
only dilute the unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the
scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work., 60 Lastly, the means
by which this state interest was furthered was to deny unemployment bene-
fits to persons unavailable for work for personal reasons.
After recognizing that the Plaintiff's free exercise liberty had been bur-
dened the Court evaluated the state's interest in the abridgement. 61 "It is
basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion
for permissible limitation.' '' 62 The Court went on to require that the state
"demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation" could further their
interest before their infringement of free exercise rights could be vali-
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l).
52. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
53. Id. at 399 n. 1.
54. Id. at 399.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 399-00.
57. Id. at 401.
58. Id. at 401-02.
59. Id. (the Court characterized the burden imposed on the plaintiff as the denial of unemployment
benefits, however, this characterization was made prior to the passage of RFRA mandating a specific
analytical framework).
60. Id. at 407.
61. Id. at 403, 406.
62. Id. at 406 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
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dated.63 Thus the Court here requires not only that the state provide a com-
pelling interest justifying its intrusion into a protected area, but also that the
state demonstrate that there was no less restrictive means by which it could
accomplish its stated interest. Hence, a two prong test was established for
the justification of the state's interest. Thus, the three step analysis pre-
sented in RFRA can easily be applied to Sherbert. Sherbert is mentioned in
RFRA to provide the appropriate legal standard to be applied in free exer-
cise cases; it was mentioned because it was the "first full expression of
what has come to be known as the compelling state interest test.
B. Wisconsin v. Yoder
Wisconsin v. Yoder involved compulsory high school education laws. 6
5
Wisconsin required that all children attend school until age sixteen.66 The
failure of parents to keep their children in school until age sixteen resulted
in criminal prosecution. 7 The Plaintiffs in the case were Amish families
who challenged the law on free exercise grounds. 68 The Amish Plaintiffs
claimed that "their children's attendance at high school, public or private,
was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.",69 This claim was
based on Plaintiffs' assertion that the values taught in public schools, "intel-
lectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness,
'worldly' success, and social life with other students[,]" were in conflict
with Amish values.
70
Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-
doing; a life of "goodness," rather than a life of intellect;
wisdom, rather than technical knowledge, community wel-
fare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather
than integration with, contemporary worldly society.71
A group of Amish parents refusing to send their children to public school
beyond the eighth grade were "charged, tried, and convicted of violating the
compulsory-attendance law" and fined.72 The Court struck down the statute
criminalizing non-attendance as unconstitutionally interfering with Plain-
tiffs' free exercise, finding that the state had failed to provide a compelling
interest justifying the abridgement of the Plaintiffs' fundamental right to
63. Id. at 407-08.
64. Dorsay, supra n. 43, at 560.
65. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,207-09 (1972).
66. Id. at 207.
67. Id. at 208-09.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 210-211.
71. /d.
72. Id. at 208.
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freely exercise their religion. 73 "Where fundamental claims of religious
freedom are at stake ... we must searchingly examine the interest that the
State seeks to promote .... 74
When viewed through the lens of RFRA, the burden with which the
Plaintiffs were faced was sending their children to school beyond the eighth
grade. "[E]nforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal
education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the
free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs." 75 The state's interest in
compulsory education stemmed from the notion that "some degree of edu-
cation is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelli-
gently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and inde-
pendence. 76  Additionally, "education prepares individuals to be self-
reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. The means employed
by the state of Wisconsin for furthering its interest in education of its citi-
zens was the criminalization of withdrawing children from school before
age sixteen. The Court found that the interest as stated was not particular-
ized enough to justify the "severe interference with religious freedom. 78
The marginal benefit to the state achieved via two more years of organized
education did not outweigh the burden placed on the religious practices of
the Plaintiffs - thus the statute could not stand.79 Yoder is considered the
furthest extension of the compelling interest test initially laid out in Sher-
bert.80 That these two cases form the high-water mark in pre-RFRA free
exercise jurisprudence explains their inclusion in RFRA when Congress
defined the legal standard to be applied in all cases where free exercise is
substantially burdened.
From Sherbert and Yoder we obtain the compelling interest test required
by RFRA for cases where free exercise is substantially burdened. 81 "Where
fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake ... we must search-
ingly examine the interest that the State seeks to promote .... ,.82 "It is basic
that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for per-
missible limitation."' 83 Sherbert supplies the additional requirement that
the state demonstrate that there is no other way to further its interest before
73. Id. at 227.
74. Id. at 221.
75. Id. at 219.
76. Id. at 221.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 227.
79. Id.
80. Dorsay, supra n. 43, at 560.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(I).
82. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
83. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 (citing Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530).
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the court will legitimize its actions. 84 These two cases embody the test
mandated by Congress with the passage of RFRA - once the threshold
showing of a substantial burden has been made, the burden shifts to the
state to justify the burden imposed with a compelling state interest accom-
plished via the least restrictive means.
While Sherbert and Yoder provide the parameters of the scrutiny re-
quired by RFRA when reviewing burdens on free exercise, Congress did
not provide a definition of substantial burden on free exercise in the stat-
ute.85 However, when viewed in light of RFRA, it can be seen that in Sher-
bert the Plaintiff's free exercise was substantially burdened by the require-
ment that she work on Saturdays.86 And the plaintiffs in Yoder were sub-
stantially burdened by the Wisconsin's requirement that their children at-
tend school until age sixteen. 87 The Court in Yoder noted that compulsory
school attendance "carries with it a very real threat of undermining the
Amish community and religious practice as they exist today[.], 88  When
analyzing if the plaintiffs' free exercise had been burdened, the Court noted
that while "no criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-
day week ... this is only the beginning, not the end, of [the] inquiry." 89
"[1]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is con-
stitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect."
9
While in Sherbert and Yoder the mechanisms for imposing the burden
were struck down, the court indicated a broader view of circumstances that
could give rise to substantial free exercise burdens. 9' Conditioning gov-
ernment benefits and criminalizing adherence are the discrete factual sce-
narios that the Court was addressing in those cases, but the principle the
Court was protecting was that the free exercise of religion cannot be sub-
stantially burdened by state action without demonstration of a compelling
state interest. Criminalization and the conditioning of government benefits
84. Id. at 406.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
86. Although the Court characterized the Plaintiffs burden as the denial of unemployment bene-
fits, it was not considering the claim through a RFRA lens. When viewed in relation to the mode of
analysis provided in RFRA the characterization of the burden as separate from the mechanism employed
to accomplish the state's interest becomes clear. Throughout the analysis the Sherbert Court focuses on
the fact that Saturday work violates the Plaintiffs religious beliefs. Moreover, reference to Sherbert in
the statute is not intended to codify its holding; it only adopts the legal standard applied in the case.
H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
87. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210-11 (the Court clearly characterizes the burden imposed on the Plaintiffs
as sending their children to public school and the entire discussion of burdens focuses school atten-
dance).
88. Id. at 218.
89. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-404.
90. Id. at 403-404 (citing Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)) (emphasis added).
91. See id. at 403-04 (finding the non-criminal nature of the statute to be only the beginning of the
inquiry, not the end).
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were the means by which the states were furthering their interests, but the
actual burdens imposed were sending children to school until age sixteen
and going to work on Saturdays. A proper understanding of the Court's
analysis requires taking one step back to examine the underlying principle
being protected by the Court - beyond the exact factual situation reviewing.
RFRA's failure to specifically define what constitutes a substantial burden
and the analyses in Yoder and Sherbert indicates a broader view of substan-
tial burdens on free exercise - not a narrower one.
C. Legislative History of RFRA
RFRA's legislative history clearly indicates Congress's intent that the le-
gal standard of review restored by RFRA be applied in all cases where
"governmental activity [has] a substantial external impact on the practice of
religion." 92  RFRA is intended to cover all governmental activity, not
merely government activity conditioning government benefits or threaten-
ing criminal prosecution. 93 A narrow reading of the substantial burden was
specifically rejected by Congress when crafting RFRA.94 "[1]n order to
violate the statute, government activity need not coerce individuals into
violating their religious beliefs nor penalize religious activity by denying
any person an equal share of the rights, benefits and privileges enjoyed by
any citizen."95 Congress did not intend to limit the situations under which a
person could state a prima facie RFRA claim to the government actions
criminalizing or denying benefits to individuals based on their adherence to
their religious traditions through its reference to Sherbert and Yoder. In
referring to the Sherbert and Yoder in the Act, Congress was not codifying
those decisions,96 but instead "restor[ing] the legal standard that was ap-
plied in those decisions." 97 Congress merely intended to specify the test to
be applied when analyzing free exercise cases - the demonstration of a
compelling state interest accomplished by the least restrictive means possi-
ble - in "all cases where the exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened. 98 Sherbert and Yoder are referenced in the statute because they are
the high-water mark of pre-RFRA jurisprudence; they are not intended as a
limit on actionable burdens. "[RFRA] is not a codification of any prior free
exercise decision but rather the restoration of the legal standard that was
applied in those decisions. ' 99
92. H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l); H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
94. H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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D. Free Exercise Jurisprudence
Moreover, both RFRA and pre-RFRA case law recognize that substantial
burdens on free exercise can manifest in many ways. Substantial burdens
have been defined in several different ways.'0° For example, a substantial
burden may exist where an adherent is prevented from engaging in conduct
or having a religious experience.'l" In another case, a law permitting a state
to conduct autopsies under certain circumstances was deemed to impose a
substantial burden on free exercise despite threatening neither criminal nor
civil liability or conditioning the receipt of government benefits.,0 2  A sub-
stantial burden has also been held to exist when a statute prevents the plain-
tiffs fulfillment of his personally held religious obligation.'
0 3
Both prior and subsequent to Smith, substantial burdens on the free exer-
cise of religion have been recognized by the courts in circumstances
broader than the two scenarios set up by Sherbert and Yoder. However,
despite demonstrating substantial burdens on free exercise not all plaintiffs
have been successful; plaintiffs have at times been denied relief because
either the government succeeded in demonstrating a compelling state inter-
100. Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 26 (5th Cir. 1995) (the Court recognized that a substantial burden
can exist where receipt of a state benefit is conditioned upon violation of a religious tenet, or where the
government compels a person to violate their religious beliefs).
101. Id. at 26 (the Court, in its recognition, requires that the experience or conduct prevented be
central in the faith, however, the definition of exercise of religion was expanded in RLUIPA and applied
to RFRA; the religious experience or conduct no longer must be central to the adherent's faith to consti-
tute exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7).
102. Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990) (the Plaintiffs were ultimately unsuccessful
due to the application of Smith, but the District Court was able to recognize a substantial burden on the
plaintiffs free exercise when an autopsy was performed on their son).
103. In re Newman, 183 B.R. 239, 251 (D. Kansas 1995) (debtors tithed to their church on the eve
of filing for bankruptcy and the church challenged the recovery of the tithed funds by the Bankruptcy
court has violating the free exercise protections of the debtors and the church under RFRA) (To show
that government action substantially burdens a religious practice, "the religious adherent ... has the
obligation to prove that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion ...
by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith
mandates. This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an
interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine." [Emphasis added.] Bryant v.
Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Graham v. C.IR., 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir.
1987), affd sub nom., Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1988)); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d
1476 (10th Cir. 1995). As the Tenth Circuit stated: "To exceed the 'substantial burden' threshold, gov-
ernment regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests some
central tenet of a [person's] individual beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a [person's] ability to express
adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person] reasonable opportunities to engage in those activi-
ties that are fundamental to a [person's] religion." Werner, 49 F.3d at 1480 (citations omitted). To be a
"substantial burden," the government action must either compel a person do something in contravention
of their religious beliefs or require them to refrain from doing something required by their religious
beliefs. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commni. 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (denying unemployment
benefits to a person who was fired because she refused to work on the Sabbath placed a substantial
burden on that person's free exercise of religion); Fleischfresser v. D. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th
Cir. 1994) (no substantial burden existed where school district reading series did not compel parents to
do or refrain from doing anything of a religious nature); Vernon v. Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1393-94
(9th Cir. 1994) (no substantial burden where "government action is neither regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory in nature").
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est or the court applied the legal standard adopted in Smith.' n Thus, simply
because a plaintiff is able to demonstrate a substantial burden on free exer-
cise it is not a foregone conclusion that the government action will be in-
validated.
I. THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
RLUIPA was passed as a companion to RFRA, and incorporates the
same substantial burden standard as RFRA.Y°5 Hence, substantial burden
case law under RLUIPA is informative when interpreting RFRA.10 6 On the
heels of RFRA's passage, 10 7 Congress passed RLUIPA. 10 8 RLUIPA was
passed in response to City of Boerne's invalidation of portions of RFRA.' °9
RLUIPA's "general rule" is modeled after the substantive language of
RFRA,"o stating that "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the reli-
gious exercise of a person.... "' RLUIPA establishes the same threshold
inquiry in whether free exercise has been substantially burdened as RFRA -
it requires demonstration that free exercise has been substantially burdened.
Thus, where possible, the language of the two statutes should be interpreted
in the same manner. While RLUIPA is limited to land use regulations and
land marking laws, 1 2 the substantial burden required to state a prima facie
RLUIPA claim is the same burden required to state a prima facie RFRA
claim because the two statutes share the same statutory framework and gen-
eral rule language." 3  This history and the cases under RLUIPA further
evince Congress's desire to increase the protections granted religious exer-
cise, and reject a narrow reading of substantial burden." 14
104. See Yang, 750 F. Supp. 558.
105. Wyatt v. Therhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1112(9th Cir. 2003).
106. See generally Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 436 (RLUIPA allows federal and state prisoners to seek
religious accommodation "pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA[.]") (cited in Navajo
Nation II, 535 F.3d at 1095 (Fletcher, J., dissenting)).
107. In City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, the Supreme Court held that Congress had exceeded its au-
thority under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in RFRA - in that it was unconstitutional as
applied to state actions. Shortly thereafter Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act.
108. San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1033 (2004) (RLUIPA and
RFRA are inextricably linked and RLUIPA was a direct response to RFRA's partial invalidation in City
of Boerne).
109. Id. at 1034.
110. 146 Cong. Rec. E 1563 (Sept. 21, 2000).
I1l. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (emphasis added).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(c).
113. See generally Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 436 (RLUIPA provides free exercise protection pursuant
to the same standard as RFRA) (cited in Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1095 (Fletcher, J., dissenting)).
114. RLPA was RLUIPA's precursor in the House and it was a response to the partial invalidation
of RFRA. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999) (cited in Michael Paisner, student author, Boerne Supremacy:
Congressional Responses to City of Boeme v. Flores and the Scope of Congress's Article I Powers, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 537 (March 2005)).
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San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill provides an interpreta-
tion of substantial burden under RLUIPA. 15 A religiously affiliated col-
lege sued the city alleging its zoning laws violated RLUIPA. 16 Although
the court found that the city's zoning ordinance did not impose a substantial
burden on the College's free exercise, the court did discuss the nature of
substantial burdens under RLUIPA. 117 The court found that free exercise is
substantially burdened when a "significantly great restriction" or "onus" is
imposed upon such exercise.118 The "ordinary, contemporary, and common
meaning"" 9 embraced by the court in San Jose Christian College when
defining substantial burden under RLUIPA rejects a narrow reading of sub-
stantial burden under RLUIPA. Because RLUIPA is patterned after and
intended as a companion to RFRA the broad formulation given substantial
burdens under RLUIPA should be informative when interpreting substantial
burden under RFRA.1 20 Under RLUIPA, substantial burden has been inter-
preted to mean "[a burden] that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fun-
damental responsibility for rendering religious exercise ... effectively im-
practicable."' 12' The words used by Congress when crafting the statute en-
able it to be interpreted according to its canonical terms. 122 Giving meaning
to the words used in the statute limits the statute's application without un-
reasonably restricting it. It allows the court to say "the legislature pushed
[free exercise protection] to the limits of the language it used, without also
supposing that it pushed [free exercise protection] to some indeterminate
further point."'' 2 3 The courts are protected against frivolous free exercise
claims because Congress modified burden with "substantial," thus requiring
more than a mere inconvenience to free exercise before strict scrutiny is
triggered. There is no indication that burdens were to be further restricted;
the clear intent of Congress was to provide broad protection for free exer-
cise.
All of the background materials to RFRA embrace a broad definition of
substantial burden. Whether a substantial burden exists is the threshold
inquiry in the RFRA free exercise analysis. As previously established, the
statute clearly sets up a three step analysis method with built in protections.
By restricting the burdens that trigger strict scrutiny to substantial ones the
Congress has inherently limited government actions falling under the stat-
ute. Moreover, the legislative history clearly indicates that all government
actions substantially burdening free exercise are subject to the review laid
115. San Jose Christian College, 360 F.3d at 1034.
116. Id. at 1027-28.
117. Id. at 1033-35.
118. Id. at 1034 (internal citation omitted).
119. Id. (citing A-Z Int'l v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003)).
120. Id. at 1033 (RLUIPA and RFRA are inextricably linked to one another).
121. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
122. Dworkin, supra n. 36, at 109-110.
123. Dworkin, supra n. 36, at 110.
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out in the statute - strict scrutiny. 24 The legislative history explicitly re-
jects limiting the circumstances under which the compelling interest test is
triggered to the discrete factual circumstances of any particular case, in-
cluding cases cited in the statute. 25 Finally, both RFRA and RLUIPA case
law demonstrate that the threshold substantial burden inquiry is not to be
read narrowly. However, reading substantial burden narrowly is exactly
what the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has done in Navajo Nation v. U.S.
Forest Service.
IV. NA VAJO NATION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE
A. Background
The discussion of free exercise in the context of public land management
was brought into the light in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service. Snow-
bowl has been an operating ski resort within the Coconino National Forest
since 1938.126 Snowbowl covers 777 acres of National Forest land on the
western flank of the San Francisco Peaks ("Peaks"). 127 The Peaks consist
of four mountains 28 known to be sacred to at least thirteen formally recog-
nized Native American Tribes. 29  Snowbowl is located at Humphrey's
Peak, 130 the most sacred mountain in the spiritual traditions of several Na-
tive American tribes.' 3' The ski resort is surrounded on three sides by the
Kachina Peaks Wilderness Area. 32
In 2002 Snowbowl sought Forest Service approval to make several im-
provements to the ski area. 133 One of the improvements proposed was the
implementation of an artificial snowmaking system. 134 Snowbowl proposed
implementing artificial snowmaking operations in order to prolong and
secure its operating season.' 35 Because Snowbowl was unable to obtain
fresh water for the operation of its snowmaking system it proposed using
treated sewage effluent in the snowmaking operation. 36 The treated sew-
age effluent is comprised of waste water from Flagstaff, Arizona's, house-
holds, hospitals, business, and industries. 137 Even after several rounds of
treatment, the water remains contaminated and is never considered
124. H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
125. Id.
126. Navajo Nation 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 883.
129. Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1081 (Fletcher, I., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1064.
131. Id. at 1098.
132. Navajo Nation 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
133. Id.
134. Navajo Nation !1, 479 F.3d at 1030-31.
135. Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1065.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1083.
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"pure."'' 38 The treated water still contains "detectable levels of enteric bac-
teria, viruses, and protozoa, including Cryptosporidium and Giardia.'
39
The Peaks are particularly holy to the surrounding Tribes, and Hum-
phrey's Peak, the location of Snowbowl, is the most sacred of the Peaks.1
40
Many of the Tribes conduct religious ceremonies on the Peaks, utilize
plants, water and other materials from the Peaks in tribal healing ceremo-
nies, and maintain shrines on the Peaks.' 4' The use of sewage water on the
Peaks will contaminate the Peaks with respect to the Tribes' religious and
cultural traditions; affecting their purity and making it very difficult, if not
impossible, for the Tribes to use the Peaks in their religious practice.1
42
B. Procedural History
The Tribes challenged the Forest Service's approval of Snowbowl's plan
to use treated sewage effluent in its artificial snowmaking operations under
RFRA in 2006.143 The Tribes sought to show that the proposed snowmak-
ing operation substantially burdened the free exercise of their religious be-
liefs.' 44 As previously mentioned, once this threshold showing of a sub-
stantial burden on free exercise is demonstrated the burden shifts to the
government to justify its actions with a compelling interest, and ultimately
demonstrate that it is furthering its interests using the least restrictive means
possible.145 However, due to the misapplication of what constitutes a "sub-
stantial burden" under RFRA the Tribes have yet to have their free exercise
rights vindicated.
46
The Tribes have met both success and failure in their efforts to assert a
RFRA claim. 147 The Tribes were initially unsuccessful at the Arizona Dis-
trict Court. 48 The court determined that the Tribes had failed to state a
prima facie RFRA claim because they failed to demonstrate a substantial
burden on their free exercise. 49 The district court reached this conclusion
despite the presence of uncontroverted evidence that the Tribes would suf-
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1098.
141. Navajo Nation 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 887-88.
142. Id. at 887-888.
143. Id. at 882.
144. Id. at 883.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
146. Navajo Nation 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 906; Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1078.
147. Navajo Nation 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 906 (district court finding that Tribes' free exercise was
not substantially burdened); Navajo Nation II, 479 F.3d at 1029 (finding that Tribes stated a prima facie
RFRA claim and Forest Service failed to justify burden with a compelling state interest); Navajo Nation
111, 535 F.3d at 1078 (denying Tribes' claims under RFRA for failing to prove free exercise was sub-
stantially burdened).
148. Navajo Nation 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
149. Id. at 907.
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fer devastating religious, spiritual, and cultural consequences if Snowbowl
were permitted to use treated sewage effluent on the Peaks. 150
The Tribes appealed the district court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and a panel of Ninth Circuit judges reversed. 151 The panel de-
termined that the Tribes had demonstrated a substantial burden on their free
exercise rights as a result of the Forest Service's approval of artificial
snowmaking operations using treated sewage effluent. 52 The court rea-
soned that the Tribes were burdened in either of two ways. 53 First, they
suffered an inability to perform a particular religious ceremony, because the
ceremony requires collecting natural resources from the Peaks that would
be too contaminated - physically, spiritually, or both for sacramental use. 154
The Forest Service itself, in its Environmental Impact Statement, had con-
ceded that "...the use of reclaimed water, would contaminate the natural
resources needed to perform the required ceremonies that have been, and
continue to be, the basis for the cultural identity for many of these tribes....
and would have an irretrievable impact on the use of the soil, plants, and
animals for medicinal and ceremonial purposes throughout the entire Peaks,
as the whole mountain is regarded as a single, living entity."'' 55
The second way in which the Tribes had been burdened was they suf-
fered "the inability to maintain daily and annual religious practices com-
prising an entire way of life, because the practices require belief in the
mountain's purity or a spiritual connection to the mountain that would be
undermined by the contamination."1 56 "[T]he presence of treated sewage
effluent on the Peaks would fundamentally undermine all of [the Tribes']
religious practices because their way of life, or 'beliefway,' is largely based
on the idea that the peaks are a pure source of their rains and the home of
the Katsinam."'' 5 7 "[The] tribes' religions have revolved around the Peaks
for centuries; that their religious practices require pure natural resources
from the Peaks; and that, because their religious beliefs dictate that the
mountain be viewed as a whole living being, the treated sewage effluent
would in their view contaminate the natural resources throughout the
Peaks."1 58 Based on these findings regarding the impact of the presence of
treated sewage effluent on the Peaks the Ninth Circuit panel determined
that the Tribes' free exercise was, in fact, substantially burdened.' 59 After
making this initial finding, the court looked to the Forest Service to justify
150. Id. at 887-896.
151. Navajo Nation II, 479 F.3d at 1029, 1033-34.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1042-43.
154. Id. at 1039, 1043.
155. Id. (internal citations omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1041 (referring to Hopi traditions and spirits).
158. Id. at 1043.
159. Id.
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its decision with a compelling state interest accomplished via the least re-
strictive means.' 6 However, the Tribes' success was short-lived.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the Tribes' claims en banc, and reversed the
panel decision - again finding that the Tribes had failed to make the thresh-
old showing of substantial burden on free exercise. 6 Without this showing
the tribes had failed to state a prima facie RFRA claim and thus did not
have an actionable claim.
C. Reading Native Americans out of RFRA
The en banc court came to its conclusion despite uncontroverted evi-
dence that the use of treated sewage effluent on the Peaks would under-
mine, and likely destroy, the Tribes' entire way of life and religious tradi-
tions. 62 The court reached this conclusion based on its restrictive view of
substantial burdens under RFRA. 16 3 This view is premised on the reasoning
that reference to the cases in defining the legal standard of review, Con-
gress also sought to limit the scope the burdens recognized by the statute.'
64
Consequently, the court interpreted substantial burden as embracing only
two discrete scenarios: (1) religious adherents are threatened with criminal
or civil liability as a consequence of exercising their religious beliefs; or (2)
receipt of government benefits is conditioned upon violation of the adher-
ent's religious beliefs. 65 These are the two scenarios giving rise to the
cases Sherbert and Yoder.'
66
The court reasoned that because Congress specifically referenced rein-
stating the compelling interest test from these two cases it was actually two
things. 167  First, it was reinstating the compelling interest test (the legal
standard) from those two cases as declared, but it was also defining sub-
stantial burden as used in RFRA' 68 The court states that "[t]he same cases
that set forth the compelling interest test also define what kind or level of
burden on the exercise of religion is sufficient to invoke the compelling
interest test."' 169 The court cites Hernandez v. C.I.R.170 as supporting that
proposition.'17  Specifically, the court cites Hernandez's finding that "'the
free exercise inquiry asks whether the government has placed a substantial
burden' on the free exercise of religion."' 172 The court uses this innocuous
160. Id.
161. NavajoNation I11, 535 F.3d at 1067.
162. Id. at 1072.
163. Id. at 1067-78.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1069-70.
166. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
167. Navajo Nation 11, 535 F.3d at 1069.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (cited in Navajo Nation III, 535 F.3d at 1069).
171. Navajo Nation 111, 535 F.3d at 1069.
172. Id. (citing Hernandez v. CLR., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).
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statement to justify its extremely narrow reading of substantial burdens
under RFRA, however, Hernandez does not contemplate the "kind or level
of burden on the exercise of religion sufficient to invoke the compelling
interest test."'' 73 On the contrary the Hernandez Court merely recognizes
that the question of whether a substantial burden is being imposed upon free
exercise is a distinct question from whether the government has a compel-
ling interest justifying the imposition under RFRA.174 The Court recog-
nizes that the burden alleged in Hernandez is insubstantial, but more impor-
tantly, the plaintiffs' claims in that case were defeated by the government's
compelling interest in a sound tax system. 75 No where in the Hernandez
reasoning is there any indication that the compelling interest test, or the
requirement of least restrictive means, should be used to define the scope of
actionable burdens on free exercise. 76 The case merely recognizes that the
initial question in free exercise cases is whether free exercise has been sub-
stantially burdened.177 Thus, this reference does not accurately support the
court's contention in Navajo Nation III.
The court's reasoning conflates the three step method of analysis laid out
in RFRA, and consequently defeats the purpose of RFRA. The merging of
the first and third questions creates a situation where the method employed
by the government to accomplish its interest defines the scope of the initial
question - whether free exercise has been substantially burdened. RFRA
establishes a mode of analysis that asks three distinct questions in a particu-
lar order. Step one asks if free exercise has been substantially burdened. 78
If the answer to this question is yes, the second question is asked - does the
government have a compelling interest justifying the burden. 79 Finally, if
the answers to the first two questions are yes, the third and final question is
asked. Is the government furthering its compelling interest through em-
ployment of the least restrictive means?
80
The court's interpretation of the importance of Congress's reference to
Sherbert and Yoder confuses and misapplies the mode of analysis provided
by Congress, and as a result artificially constrains RFRA's application and
operates to undermine the legitimacy of Native American religious practice.
Sherbert and Yoder were both decided prior to the passage of RFRA and
thus do not adhere to the mode of analysis prescribed by RFRA. However,
this does not prevent viewing them in light of the statute. Moreover, they
173. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 699-00.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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are referenced in the statute with the sole purpose of establishing a particu-
lar legal standard of review.' 
81
When viewed through a RFRA lens it is easy to see how Congress in-
tended the analysis to operate. When analyzing Sherbert post-RFRA it is
easy to see the three step analysis at work. The burden imposed on the
plaintiff was being required to work on Saturdays. The justifying interest
asserted by the state was preventing fraudulent unemployment claims from
being filed. The means employed by the state for accomplishing this inter-
est were denying benefits to applicants that cannot work on Saturdays for
personal reasons. Although the court does not frame its analysis this
way,' 82 when the case is considered with RFRA in mind it is clearly seen
that the burden on the plaintiffs free exercise is not being denied unem-
ployment benefits but working on Saturdays. The means by employed by
the state for accomplishing its goal of preventing fraudulent unemployment
benefit claims is an important part of the RFRA analysis, however it is not
first to be considered. This portion of the analysis comes last - after the
plaintiff has established a substantial burden on his free exercise and the
government has demonstrated a compelling interest. The same is true in
Yoder. When viewed through a RFRA lens the burden on the Amish fami-
lies was sending their children to school beyond the eighth grade. The
state's interest in educating its children was offered by the state in justifica-
tion of the burden imposed on the Plaintiffs' free exercise. The means em-
ployed by the state of accomplishing its educational interest is to criminal-
ize keeping children out of school. Thus, the means utilized by the state -
threat of criminal liability - is not part of the inquiry into whether the Plain-
tiffs' free exercise is burdened, but part of the third inquiry into whether the
state has utilized the least restrictive means possible to accomplish its goal
of educating its youth.
Therefore, the burdens imposed come from Saturday work and compul-
sory education. A substantial burden could, conceivably, also come from
government corruption of necessary religious resources. For example, if a
state law authorized state officials to enter every Catholic Church in the
state and dump a bucket of sewage water into the churches' baptismal fonts
no one would deny that free exercise has been substantially burdened -
Catholics require blessed holy water for their baptisms - and they are now
unable to use clean water in their baptisms. Ignoring the other implications
of a state law such as this, the state action neither conditions a benefit nor
threatens criminal liability - but it does make it exceedingly difficult for
Catholics to have a necessary religious experience. This is essentially what
has happened to the Tribes.
181. H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
182. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (the Court describes the burden faced by the Plaintiff as disqualifica-
tion for benefits).
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What the court has done in Navajo Nation III is take the third portion of
the analysis - the part considering how the state is accomplishing its inter-
est - and superimpose that over the top of the initial inquiry into whether
free exercise has been burdened. That type of analysis defeats the underly-
ing purpose of RFRA because it relieves the state of having to justify in-
fringements on free exercise a large portion of free exercise cases. By lim-
iting RFRA's application to cases where plaintiffs are facing criminal or
civil liability for exercising their religious beliefs and cases where plaintiffs
are denied government benefits due to adherence to their beliefs the court
has ignored Congress's goal to have strict scrutiny apply in all cases where
free exercise is substantially burdened.
If the mode of analysis established in RFRA is respected, an analysis of
the Tribes' claims in Navajo Nation III would take the following form. The
court would initially ask whether the Tribes' free exercise has been substan-
tially burdened. This question, however, would not be artificially con-
strained by the method employed by the state for accomplishing its inter-
ests. It would be based on whether a "significantly great onus" or "restric-
tion" has been placed on the Tribes' ability to freely exercise.183 Therefore,
the fact that the Tribes' cultural and religious traditions would be devas-
tated would permit a threshold finding that the Tribes' free exercise had
been substantially burdened. Permitting the question to be answered with-
out limiting the mechanism of substantial burden to the facts of Sherbert
and Yoder would demonstrate fidelity to RFRA's purpose and intended
application: that it apply in all cases where religion is substantially bur-
dened, and not be limited to instances where adherents face liability or are
denied government benefits.184
The burden would then shift to the Forest Service to justify the burden
imposed on the Tribes' free exercise with a compelling state interest. Be-
cause the analysis does not end with the inquiry into the presence of a sub-
stantial burden, Tribal success is not a foregone conclusion. It is possible
that the federal government has a compelling interest justifying the burden
placed on the Tribes' free exercise. Perhaps it has a compelling interest in
managing federally owned lands according to its own prerogatives, in pro-
viding multiple use recreation in the National Forest, or any other reason
that the federal government has provided for its decision to permit artificial
snowmaking operations on the Peaks.
Only after we have recognized the existence of a substantial burden on
free exercise and a compelling governmental interest in the action causing
the burden do we need to examine the means employed by the government
for accomplishing its objectives. The last question will assess the means
employed by the Forest Service for accomplishing its compelling interest.
183. See San Jose Christian College, 360 F.3d at 1034.
184. H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
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This final question is distinct from the threshold inquiry into whether the
Tribes' free exercise has been substantially burdened. The means em-
ployed in this case are permitting treated sewage effluent to contaminate the
Peaks. The means do not criminalize the Tribes' adherence nor do they
deny the Tribes a government benefit because of their adherence. Instead,
the means take the form of federal approval of an artificial snowmaking
system. However, when the statute is properly interpreted it is clear that a
substantial burden can take many forms, and the means adopted by the gov-
ernment in accomplishing its compelling interest cannot define the level or
kind of burdens recognized by the statute.
CONCLUSION
Analyzing the Tribes' claim in this way maintains integrity between the
judicial determination of the rights of these particular plaintiffs and the
statute. It does not guarantee victory for the Tribes; however, it also does
not relieve the Forest Service of its burden - to justify the infringement of
the Tribes' free exercise rights. By kicking the Tribes out of court on the
basis of the first question, the legitimacy of Tribal spiritual traditions is
undermined. The court cannot rationally find that the Forest Service's ac-
tion will devastate and destroy the spiritual foundations of these Tribes
while simultaneously finding that their free exercise is not substantially
burdened - more importantly the statute does not permit this.
Congress specifically cited to Justice O'Connor's harsh, concurring lan-
guage in Smith when passing RFRA: "[t]he compelling interest test reflects
the First Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest
extent possible in a pluralistic society. For the court to deem this command
a 'luxury,' is to denigrate '[t]he very purpose of the Bill of Rights."'1 85 The
"luxury" that Justice O'Connor refers to is our ability to deem presump-
tively invalid, "as applied to religious objectors, every regulation of conduct
that does not protect an interest of the highest order.'' 86 Protecting the free
exercise rights of Native American practitioners is not a luxury - it is a re-
quirement of RFRA. It is the responsibility of the courts to uphold the rule
of law. In doing so a court's legal decisions should display fidelity to deci-
sions made by Congress. Congress has mandated that all government ac-
tions substantially burdening free exercise of religion be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Congress has chosen not define the exact circumstances that give
rise to a substantial burden on free exercise, but instead embrace a broad
reading of substantial burdens. Congress provided a particular legal stan-
dard of review to apply to "all governmental actions which have a substan-
tial external impact on the practice of religion."'' 87 Consequently, the cir-
185. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903.
186. Id. at 888.
187. H.R. Rpt. 103-88.
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cumstances giving rise to substantial burdens on free exercise cannot be
limited to the circumstances outlined in Sherbert and Yoder without "writ-
ing Native Americans out of RFRA."
